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Abstract 
Despite expanding literatures on financialization, scholarship exploring the relationship to labour and 
the labour process remains under-developed. A further obstacle has arisen from arguments that novel 
financialized modes of value extraction render the labour process and labour process analysis less 
relevant. This article challenges that view and explores how the labour process is still a vital focal point 
for value creation and extraction. It sets out what scholars should ‘look for’ to understand the ways in 
which distinctively financialized mechanisms operate in non-financial corporations and how these 
dynamics are translated into outcomes for and through labour. The article then provides four key 
propositions, drawing on labour process theory, which specify how those mechanisms are 
operationalized and their consequences. 
 
Introduction 
As the influence of financialization extends, so a number of diverse literatures have emerged which 
increasingly converge on the message that financialization is a distinct form of capitalism which elevates 
financial markets, financial actors and financial motives (Epstein, 2005 p.3; Lapavitsas, 2011).  A review 
of scholarship on financialization identifies three thematic strands – as a regime of accumulation; of the 
modern corporation and of everyday life (Van der Zwan, 2014).   
Of these strands, by far the most attention has been paid to financialization as an accumulation regime. 
Though these discussions appear to move from macro to micro, the focus on labour, work and 
employment is limited.  Where labour is brought into the picture, the emphasis is on indirect outcomes 
and inferences rather than a systematic examination of how the labour process is implicated in value 
creation and extraction under financializationi. Recent contributions from Appelbaum and Batt (2014) 
and Appelbaum, Batt and Clark (2013) argue that financialization necessitates a move away from 
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exploring value extraction within the labour process.  This, they claim, is because financialized value is 
extracted primarily outside of the labour process.  As Appelbaum and Batt (1994) previously argued the 
importance of mutual gains from high performance work systems, this is a significant shift.  However 
their focus, and indeed of much of the literature on financialization and labour, is on private equity (PE) 
and new investment funds (NIFs) rather than the much broader issue of financialization in non-financial 
corporations (NFCs).   
Where explicit attention has been paid to financialization in the workplace, gaps remain.  Perhaps the 
most notable contribution has been the debate around Thompson’s disconnected capitalism thesis 
(DCT) (Thompson, 2003, 2013; Clark, 2009). Thompson links the pursuit of shareholder value, the 
behaviour of firm management and negative impacts on high performance workplace productivity 
bargains.  However, there is an acknowledged failure to specify and explore the mechanisms through 
which these trends take place.  Scholarship has yet to uncover the novel and distinctively financialized 
activities taking place within organisations that both affect and are affected by labour.  In other words 
‘what’ is happening is increasingly apparent but the ‘how’ is less clear.  Uncovering such mechanisms 
requires close explorations of the dynamics of value extraction and creation in the labour process at firm 
and value chain level.  This article identifies such mechanisms and in doing so offers a corrective to 
the influential argument by Appelbaum et al and the wider emergent assumption in the literature, that 
the labour process is marginalised within financialization.  The article proceeds by retracing these steps. 
It examines the analyses of financialized regimes of accumulation and articulations of links to labour.  
Secondly it discusses the contributions of the DCT and research on NIFs, setting out the gaps and limits 
to our knowledge of financialization-labour dynamics. It then seeks to defend and extend the scope of 
labour process analysis (LPA) by outlining how key transmission and control mechanisms of 
financialization unfold in NFCs, arguing that novel accounting techniques play a key role. A set of 
propositions are then developed outlining the impact of and implications for labour.   
Finance-dominated regimes of accumulation 
There is now a significant body of work from ‘accumulation scholars’ ranging from heterodox 
economists to Marxists (van der Zwan, 2014), concerned with how financialization reflects and shapes 
the pattern and pace of accumulation and the competing claims of agents within industrial and financial 
circuits of capital (Demirović and Sablowski, 2013; Lapavitsas, 2001; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013; 
Krippner, 2005; Milburg, 2008; Müller, 2013; Stockhammer, 2008).  Though interest in the links between 
finance and capitalism  dates back to Hilferding (1981), contemporary commentators focus on the 
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growing share of financial assets and profits of financial corporations relative to GDP, emphasising the 
point that NFCs in the ‘real economy’ are fully-engaged actors in financial markets. Use of the term 
regime does not imply a coherent, stable growth trajectory. The studies listed above all explore the 
destabilising impact of financialization on growth, additional vulnerability to crises and skewed 
distributional outcomesii.  Additionally, financialization imposes a value logic that disrupts institutional 
and product market configurations identified traditionally by comparative political economy literatures.  
This has led to some justified criticism of over-determinism with respect to contingency and diversity 
arising from differential exposure to capital markets and incentives for financial agents in national 
economies (Engelen and Konings, 2010), as well as varied outcomes from the interventions of financial 
agents such as private equity (Wood and Wright  2012).   Our concern is somewhat different. To the 
extent that literatures on finance-dominant regimes have relevance to this article, it is when the focus 
goes beyond the macro economy to the firm and inter-firm level.  Pressures to meet capital market 
requirements and/or service debt predispose NFCs to focus on financially leveraged outcomes and 
balance sheet capitalization over operational measures and outcomes. The resource-reward nexus 
becomes distorted as the corporate elite position themselves to extract a disproportionate amount of 
value in relation to the creation process (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). ‘Profit financialization’ focuses 
on leveraging value through financial extractions and assets compared to the rate of return on 
manufacturing and operational investment (Müller, 2013, 9; Milburg, 2008, p. 423). This exacerbates the 
existing trend of declining proportions of investment as a percentage of operating surplus and has 
implications for labour with respect to skill development and other aspects of human capital 
development (Demirović and Sablowski, 2013; Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). However, aside from 
inferred effects, plus general talk of transfer of risk to labour, explanatory links at meso and micro level 
remain weak or indirect. In particular, how and in what ways the labour process remains a source of 
value are largely unexplored.  
The role of labouriii and the labour process 
The DCT brings to the fore the sometimes lost LPA links between workplace change and capitalist 
political economy and claims that financialization shifts the interconnections and pattern of dominance 
between industrial, financial and commercial circuits of capital.  Financialization becomes a key driver of 
corporate and workplace change leading to undermining of the stable conditions necessary for 
workplace-based productivity bargains and investment in human capital. This involves a triple 
disconnect: between employer objectives in the work and employment spheres; between managerial 
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levels and layers within firm governance; between corporate dynamics and state regulation in national 
business systems. 
This theme of disconnections is pursued in recent contributions from Appelbaum, Batt and Clark (2013) 
and Appelbaum and Batt (2014), though they prefer ‘breaches of trust’ by PE to workers and other 
stakeholders. They offer an incisive analysis of how the financialized business model of PE makes money 
through extracting value from other stakeholders including customers, creditors, suppliers and 
employees. Their illustrative cases provide evidence of negative labour impacts on jobs, pensions, wages 
and work intensity. However this leads them to assume the marginalisation of the labour process in 
value creation and they call for a diverging analytical frame. They argue that scholarship can ‘contribute 
to a more fine-grained theory of value-extraction by moving beyond the labour process and an exclusive 
focus on labour-management relations to reveal the variety of sources of value extraction under new 
forms of capitalist governance… the organization of work and labour relations is a limited frame’ (2013, 
p500). Later they extend the argument asserting the need to ‘move beyond labour process analysis’ (our 
emphasis) and towards ‘institutional analysis of PE mechanisms of value redistribution’ (p. 513).  
There are three areas of contention here. First, does moving ‘beyond the labour process’ allow for 
exploration of value extraction through labour, as well as impacts on workers?  Second, by referring to 
‘an exclusive focus on management-labour relations’ the authors mis-characterise the scope of LPA.  
Third, NIFs are part of, but not the main story of financialization.  In the recent period 11 percent of total 
assets under management worldwide are held by private equity, hedge funds and sovereign wealth 
funds (Gospel and Pendleton, 2014:3). Appelbaum and Batt are rightly keen to emphasise the distinctive 
characteristics and effects of PE, focusing on the ways in which higher levels of debt used to buy out 
companies lead to enhanced pressures for higher than average returns in a short time frame; as well as 
to the complete dominance of PE partners in firm governance. Despite careful noting of these 
differences to NFCs, Appelbaum and Batt’s general theoretical conclusions are premised on the view 
that PE ‘exemplifies’ financialization. (2014, p6). However, the dynamics pertinent to value extraction 
and the labour process may be at least partially different in NFCs.   
This critical interrogation of the Appelbaum, Batt and Clark argument is not in itself adequate.  As 
indicated earlier, largely lacking are studies exploring how distinctive financialized activities are 
connected to or manifested in NFCs, and more specifically how shareholder value pressures are 
‘translated’ into workplace outcomes and experiences.  In another recent contribution exploring the 
labour outcomes associated with PE and other NIFs, Gospel and Pendleton (2014) refer to ‘transmission 
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mechanisms’ as shortened time horizons, new corporate strategies and shifts in the balance of 
stakeholder governance, though noting that ‘downstream’ activities are largely indirect and not easily 
traceable. The latter is indeed true, but what is needed are accounts that can at least proceed towards 
that goal.  A useful framework is offered by Baud and Durand (2012, p243-4) in their study of 
financialization and retail firms. Baud and Durand distinguish between the (mainly macro) 
financialization of objectives (value norms/strategy, investment) and the firm level financialization of 
operations, including relations with workers, customers and suppliers. Clark and Macey (2015) also draw 
on these categories to identify the ‘contagion effects’ of financialization within firms, though they 
combine them with the idea of ‘profit’ and ‘control’ financialization. The former was discussed earlier, 
while the latter is said to identify managerial strategies that are applied in the workplace.  
These categories are helpful in indicating where to look, but the next section sets out what scholars 
should look for to more fully understand the mechanisms driving financialized outcomesiv.   
Financialized investment and valuation in NFCs 
Distinctively financialized pressures enter NFCs via institutional investors who have grown in 
prominence to own over 80percent of UK equities (Roberts et al., 2006, p. 278) and 73 percent of US 
equities in 2009 (Tonello and Rabinov 2010). The principal activity of institutional investors appears to 
consist not merely of holding NFC shares, but  buying and selling them based on perceptions of intrinsic 
value to outperform the index or asset class they are benchmarked against (Blake and Tillerman, 2001; 
Hendry et al., 2006, p.1103). High investor turnover means corporate management must continuously 
stimulate a market for their shares by making them desirable both to existing and potential investors 
(Hendry et al., 2006; Roberts et al., 2006).  Corporate chief executives and finance directors now commit 
more of their time to investor communications (Pye, 2001).   
In addition to the changing composition of financial markets, recent decades have seen a shift in 
investor strategies. The idea that stock has an intrinsic value distinct from the listed price, calculated by 
estimating future performance took hold and achieved widespread legitimation when economic theory 
labelled market listings ‘informationally deficient’ (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).  Investor acceptance of 
the paradox positioned estimations of future firm performance as key sources of competitive advantage 
among the investment community. To estimate intrinsic value, investors, usually via financial analysts, 
combine company information with a predictive valuation model.  A key output of an analyst's report is 
‘target price’ which is their expectation of a company’s share price in twelve months. Financial analysts 
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play a central intermediary role in capital markets in interpreting and disseminating corporate financial 
and related market information and their investment recommendations have a material impact on 
trading activity (Womack, 1996).  Institutional investors report using an average of nine different 
valuation factors to gauge intrinsic stock value (Merrill Lynch Institutional Factor Survey, 2006).  The 
most popular valuation factors are listed in Table One and trends in recent years indicate that investors 
are placing heightened emphasis on cash returns (Bank of America Merrill Lynch Institutional Factor 
Survey, 2012).  
Table One: Top Valuation Factors used by Institutional Investors 
Factor  
Percent 
Using 
Price Earnings (P/E) Ratio  81 
Beta 68 
Enterprise Value (EV)/EBITDA 60 
Return on Earnings (ROE) 55 
Size 54 
Price/Free Cash Flow (P/FCF) 53 
Price to Book (P/B) Ratio 53 
Share Repurchase 51 
Estimate Revision 50 
Profit Margins 47 
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Institutional Factor Survey 2012 
The prominence of these factors mean it is important to consider how they shape value related decision 
making within NFCs. Creating investor confidence in an equity’s intrinsic value requires management to 
craft corporate strategies that enhance the organisation’s performance under the numerous 
financialized valuation factors.   A concern shared among a diverse range of academic and professional 
commentators is the tendency of the dominant valuation factors to steer corporate management away 
from internal firm investment and value creating activities (Orhangazi, 2008).  In particular, popular 
financial factors tend to produce ratios not values, comprising of a numerator and denominator which 
are an indication of profits and costs respectively.  Firm management have generally sought to improve 
their ratio by reducing the denominator through cost reduction, because value extraction activities are 
more predictable and generally accessible within a short timeframe. Increasing the growth side of the 
ratio is riskier as value creation gains are less certain and only likely to appear five to ten years later 
(Christensen and van Bever, 2014, p. 4). In fact, financial actors tend not to respond positively to 
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complex exploratory innovation (Gupta, 2012) and favour value creation strategies only among firms 
deemed to be high performing (Jacobs and Singhal, 2014).  The pressure on management to reduce 
costs is compounded by the historic long-term decline in the ability of firms in many sectors to create 
value through raising price.  Prominent innovation strategists lament this trend towards the ‘wrong’ kind 
of innovation namely ‘efficiency innovation’ which eliminates jobs rather than ‘market-creating 
innovation’ that creates them (Christensen and van Bever, 2014).   
 
All these processes drive financialization of NFC investment which takes two main forms. First, an 
investor-oriented redistributive agenda through dividend payments and share buybacks (Van der Zwan, 
2014, p.108). Second, the growth of investment in financial assets and activities rather than those at an 
‘operational’ level, often to the detriment of the productive capacity of firms.  The move away from 
value creating investment is increasingly apparent in sectors where product market returns are longer 
term and less predictable.  In ‘Big Pharma’ the high R&D spend required for exploratory innovation and 
the difficulty in quantifying future product market returns has seen trends towards outsourcing of R&D 
activities to bio technology firms (Andersson at al, 2010). Financialized investment also helps to explain 
trends within certain business models.   Baud and Durand (2012) show that the financial assets ratio of 
leading retail firms in the 2000s increased for most, accounting for an upward trend in return on equity 
despite constraints on domestic sales growth and international expansion. Milburg also notes evidence 
indicating ‘a change in the gap between the rate of return on manufacturing investment and the rate of 
return on financial assets’ (2009: 423).  Ultimately, the novel financialized valuation factors are key 
transmission mechanisms connecting NFCs with the interests of investors. Achieving these financialized 
targets has led to distinct forms of organisational control or ‘control financialization’.   
 
NFCs rely heavily on accounting techniques that provide quasi-legal firm level control mechanisms to 
position financial targets central and dominant in decision making (Froud et al., 2006; O’Neill, 2001). 
Budgeting processes can provide a firm wide control mechanism through which targets relating to value 
creation and extraction can be disseminated and measured (Cushen, 2013).  Accounting regulations 
require that internal company investment and projects  be assessed and justified on the basis of 
measures such as Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return (IRR), payback period, discounted payback 
period, average accounting rate of return and profitability index.  Management can select the financial 
measure(s) that most closely mirror the calculations of the valuation factor(s) they wish to perform well 
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against, allowing them to orient and assess lower organisational levels to the financialized targets.  
However arriving at the desired financial endgame is neither straightforward nor automatic.   
 
Labour process issues and impacts 
Financial targets must be delivered by employees – meaning it is within the labour process that 
interventions prompted by the speculative financialized firm valuations confront a ‘moment of truth’.  In 
the discussion below are four interrelated propositions consistent with LPA that link the aforementioned 
transmission and control mechanisms with financialized labour outcomes.    
Proposition one: Financialization drives forms of value extraction based on squeezing labour costs and 
revenues. 
The pursuit of shareholder value, expressed by financial valuation factors, prompts ‘dramatic efforts to 
control costs’ (Milburg 2009: p.428) as ‘market pressure to maintain asset prices is, at the same time, a 
pressure on labour as variable capital’ (Bryan et al., 2009: p.467).   Value extraction via cost cutting is 
associated with labour and the labour process through headcount reduction interventions such as 
redundancies, outsourcing, centralisation and supply chain harmonisation, as well as increasing reward 
insecurity.  Headcount reduction is central to financialized ‘downsize and redistribute’ strategies 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) and share buybacks (Lazonick, 2012).  Furthermore, accounting 
techniques are important mechanisms used to identify and communicate labour cost reduction 
initiatives.  In NFCs, employee related expenditure is categorised in financial accounts as a cost, namely 
operational expenditure (OPEX). OPEX reduction is a key measure for signalling commitment to and 
delivery of targets to shareholders.  Financial markets react positively to announcements relating to 
OPEX reduction, particularly redundancies and outsourcing (Farber and Hallock, 1999). Recent decades 
have seen increased use of cost accounting techniques such as activity based costing (ABC) and 
benchmarking due primarily to the restructuring and cost cutting opportunities that ABC prompts.  The 
shares of firms adopting ABC outperform matched non‐ABC firms in the short term by approximately 27 
percent (Kennedy and Affleck-Graves, 2001).   
Additionally, financialization affects wage levels and dispersion given that ‘as the circuits of capital 
change…[there is an] emphasis to drive down the labour share’ (Clark and Macey, 2015, p.26).  Though 
rapidly growing wage inequality within firms is a longer term macro-economic phenomenon, increased 
emphasis on profit targets and reducing payroll sharpens that divide. Cost reduction targets exert 
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downward pressure on wages and constraints on the ability to share performance improvements with 
the workforce (Cushen, 2013). This is confirmed in Appelbaum and Batt’s illustrative cases, ‘In the PE-
owned plants post buyout, higher productivity was accompanied by lower employment growth and 
wage reductions, thereby contributing to an increase in the productivity-wage gap’ (2014, 233). In some 
instances financial engineering and squeezing labour might not be coterminous processes, such as when 
staffing costs had been cut back in UK privatised utilities to the extent that debt leverage was a more 
viable source of value reallocation (Goergen et al 2014). However,.  Such practices are still likely to 
weaken the position of and constrain future internal investments in labour, thereby indirectly recoupling 
the processes.  
Proposition two: Financialized investment is a driver of perpetual restructuring that exacerbates work 
insecurity and intensification. 
Interventions designed to ward off investor risk and ensure investor returns, such as moving to high 
dividend ratios, share buybacks and taking on debt, create a bias towards investment that is geared 
more towards financial engineering.  This, in turn, feeds corporate restructuring which has surged in 
recent decades in order to create a vision of a better future for investors.  It arises primarily from the 
desire to deliver value through the disposal and acquiring of corporate assets based on their status 
within accounting techniques. For example it is not uncommon for firms to outsource teams of 
personnel, a cost, but retain ownership of the equipment, an asset employees continue to use when 
outsourced.  Within this uncertainty labour absorbs risk disproportionate to the reward they may derive. 
The perpetual restructuring and continuous organisational upheaval affect labour and the labour 
process in two key ways. Firstly, employees experience heightened employment insecurity due to the 
emphasis on headcount reduction (Chan, 2013; Kalleberg, 2011, Lazonick, 2012) as well as role 
insecurity, as their position and status within the organisation is in perpetual flux (Cushen, 2013). 
Secondly, depleting internal operational investment and continuous structural upheaval trigger work 
intensification linked to reduced headcount, use of peripheral employment, less development and 
training and the need to navigate continuously restructured work processes and changing personnel.  
Value gains from reorganisation of work and restructuring of employment in firms and across supply 
chains are appropriated by shareholders (Baud and Durand 2012: p.256). Combining elements of 
propositions two and three, Clark and Macey’s (2015, pp. 19-20) study shows how pressures to service 
debt and dividend payments following a PE takeover of the Automobile Association in 2013 led to 3400 
employees being ‘managed out of the business’ with work intensification for those remaining.  
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Proposition three: Financialization engenders a shift in control mechanisms that strengthens punitive 
performance regimes.  
Financialized valuations create a ‘performance exposure’ (Bryan et al., 2009, p.466) that drives 
management by numbers and strengthens the trend towards centrally driven, short term financial 
measures of performance.  Firm valuations prompt a myriad of, often concurrent, workplace initiatives 
that come with defined financial targets that management hope will be accepted and delivered by 
labour at the point of production. The worst thing investors can be told is that an organization did not 
achieve targets and a failure to deliver the numbers with one initiative prompts more interventions in 
order to find alternative routes to the promised future. The consequences for labour relate primarily to 
the increased use of numerics in performance management as corporate profit targets are cascaded 
downwards (Ezzamel et al, 2008). Localised versions of these financial measures are disseminated 
throughout the organisation and used to measure progress against both value creation and extraction 
targets, aided in many cases by electronic monitoring and tighter work flow (Taylor 2013). The shift 
towards cascaded financial controls, together with the associated insecurity and transfer of risk to 
labour either marginalises cultural and commitment-led interventions or diminishes their potential 
effectiveness (Cushen and Thompson, 2012). This is not to say that normative controls are irrelevant in 
managerial regimes, but that high performance and commitment-seeking are frequently recast as 
conduct and behavioural descriptors manifested in performance demonstrated by achievement of 
financial targets (Taylor 2013, p. 46-7). New configurations of control also recast labour responses. 
Employees across a range of skill levels and disciplines are increasingly required to consider and quantify 
their contribution to the ‘bottom line’ (Ezzamel et al., 2008; Gleadle and Cornelius, 2008).   
Proposition four: Financialization reinforces market discipline and market attitudes  
Tighter internal controls, post-crash fiscal constraints and other external circumstances favourable to 
capital, combined with longer term weakening of collective labour organisation has resulted in market 
discipline limiting the scope for resistance. A range of OECD statistics and qualitative studies show how 
capital has reasserted its power over organised labour and labour markets in the US, UK and Western 
Europe (Peters, 2011). However, labour’s response is not limited to mere compliance. Enhanced 
instrumentalization of labour effects employees’ behaviours and perceptions of the employment 
experience.  Business sources from HR professionals (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
2007) and The Harvard Business Review (Caulkin 2014) join academics  in charting declining trust and 
employee engagement levels, rising cynicism and a more general crisis of attachment and disaffection 
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for companies (Naus et al, 2007; McCann 2013). Financialization is part of and adds to these trends, 
prompting cynical and calculative behaviours in circumstances where employees understand themselves 
as a quantifiable, disposable commodity and as a distinct stakeholder with interests that conflict with 
and lose out to those of capital.  
Concluding remarks 
Far from being marginalized by financialization, this article demonstrates that the manner in which 
labour and the labour process is being called upon to contribute to organisational value has in fact 
expanded.  Appelbaum, Batt and Clark (2013) have called for a more fine grained account of value 
extraction that looks beyond the labour process and labour process analysis.  While in no way dissenting 
from the view that financialization broadens the dynamics of value creation and extraction at macro and 
micro level, there remains a key challenge in reverse terms – to connect the two phenomena. An 
important part of making such connections is to identify ‘transmission’ mechanisms that go beyond 
general reference to short time horizons or new corporate strategies. A distinctive contribution of this 
article is that it identifies meso level mechanisms, in particular valuation factors and accounting 
practices that act to coordinate an assembly of firm level elements, namely people and processes, 
orienting them toward achievement of financial targets.  The outcomes manifested in the labour 
process, such as headcount reduction, work restructuring and cascading financial controls, operate both 
as key subjective features of corporate narratives and objective measures of ‘progress’ towards meeting 
capital market expectations.  This is consistent with the previously-discussed concepts of profit and 
control financialization (Clark and Macey 2015), with meso-level mechanisms operating as means of 
embedding broader financialized objectives through operational strategies and measures.  
It is important, however, to recognise that financialization within the corporate sphere is not a single, 
coherent process. Nor is it defined by the complete supplanting of value expansion through production. 
Rather it is characterised by tensions between sources of value extraction and the inability of firms to 
achieve targets in the manner speculated or, in some cases, at all (Burnham, 2010; Froud et al., 2006). 
For labour, many of the propositions outlined in the previous sections are, ‘interacting with accelerating 
and exacerbating longer term trends such as labour market insecurity, externalization and 
internationalisation’ (Thompson, 2013). Labour process change therefore continues to reflect product 
and labour market competition and sources of value. This is a shift in the circuits of capital not a 
wholesale displacement and the extent to which financialization is a primary or secondary driver of 
change varies by industry.  
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Finally, while conditions of value extraction have created a need to move beyond workplace-centric 
employment relations and national varieties of capitalism, LPA is well placed to make connections 
between accumulation regimes and firm and industry-level dynamics. Continuing to focus on labour and 
the labour process is an important corrective to the claims that changes in value creation and extraction 
in financialization and other spheres are focused wholly or mainly outside production. This is clearly not 
the end of the story. A priority for future research is company, industry or value chain framing in which 
financialization trajectories and the relations with labour can be more adequately traced and explained. 
Aggregate level data on the general characteristics and effects of financialization is very useful for 
understanding and critiquing the new business models.  However,  as Appelbaum and Batt (2014) 
accept, there are limits to this data in assessing labour issues such as job destruction and creation – 
hence their own detailed company cases. With a clearer identification of mechanisms and their effects 
at strategic and operational levels, this article has been a contribution towards the development of 
frameworks for undertaking such investigation.  
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Notes 
                                                          
i Labour is viewed as a central source of value creation and financialization  acts in part through value extraction in 
the labour process. Though a work in progress, this terminology draws on radical accounting frameworks (Lazonick 
and Mazzucato 2013; Froud J, Johal S, Leaver and Williams K, 2006) rather than the labour theory of value.  
ii Confusion in the use of accumulation regime can arise because the term derives in part from regulation theory, 
some of whose adherents argued that financialization offered a basis for a new stable growth regime (see Wood 
and Wright 2012). As the detailed treatment in van der Zwan (2014) makes clear that orientation is not shared by 
contemporary accumulation scholars.  
iii A focus on labour is clearly broader than on the labour process. For example, Bryan, Martin and Rafferty (2009) 
argue that financialization constitutes labour as a form of capital, advancing into the household and private sphere 
as a ‘frontier of accumulation’, binding labour to ‘participate in expanded reproduction’. 
iv A mechanism is ‘. . .an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of them. A mechanism 
is not so much about ‘nuts and bolts’ as about ‘cogs and wheels’.. .the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is 
produced’ (Hernes 1998, p. 74 in Davis & Marquis, 2005, p.336). 
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